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SUBSTANTIVE RULEMAIUNG AND THE FTC
I.

INTRODUCTION

Congress established the Federal Trade Commission in 1914 for the purpose
of identifying and halting specific instances of unfair competition.1 Until 1962
all the work of the FTC had been adjudicative rather than legislative. 2 The
commission relied upon complaint cases and several types of informal settlement
techniques, notably the trade practice conference, to fulfill its congressional
mandate. 3
The commissioners of the FTC began to urge the use of rulemaking procedures in speeches and articles during the early 1960's. 4 The FTC went beyond
mere advocacy when on June 1, 1962 it amended its General Procedures and
Rules of Practice to permit the promulgation of trade regulation rules.,
The FTC's first use of the power was dramatic. On January 17, 1964 it be1. "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in commerce, are declared unlawful." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970). The bill's sponsor, Congressman J. Harry Covington of Maryland, told the House: "The function of the Federal
trade commission will be to determine whether an existing method of competition is unfair,
and, if it finds it to be unfair, to order the discontinuance of its use." 51 Cong. Rec. 14932
(1914). See Votaw, Antitrust in 1914: The Climate of Opinion, 24 A.B.A. Antitrust 14, 18
(1964).
2. Wegman, Cigarettes and Health: A Legal Analysis, 51 Cornell L.Q. 678, 740 (1966).
3. "Trade Practice Conference Rules.-Under the Commission's trade practice conference
procedure the Commission, acting in the public interest, invites all members of an industry
to attend an industry conference to consider practices in that industry and to adopt rules
covering unfair practices therein. After further hearing of interested parties, rules are promulgated for the industry and the members afforded opportunity to indicate their willingness to
observe such rules in the conduct of their business. By agreeing to abide by the rules for their
industry they, in effect, agree to abandon or refrain from using the stated unfair practices.
"Trade practice rules, as promulgated by the Commission, are divided into Group I and
Group II rule [sic]. Group II rules have no status other than as expressions of what is considered desirable in the interest of promoting fair competitive conditions. Group I rules define
industry practices which are deemed to be unfair methods of competition, unfair or deceptive acts or practices, or other illegal practices, under laws administered by the Commission,
as construed by the Commission and the courts. They do not purport to make unlawful any
practice which is not illegal under existing statutes. They merely catalog such illegal practices
for the information and guidance of industry members." Freer, An Analysis of Federal
Trade Commission Procedures as They Relate to the Administrative Procedure Act, In
The Federal Administrative Procedure Act and the Administrative Agencies 422-23 (G.
Warren ed. 1947) (footnote omitted). See also Note, The FTC's Claim of Substantive RuleMaking Power: A Study in Opposition, 41 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 330, 334 (1972).
4. The various statements and views of the commissioners during this period are collected
and analyzed in Burrus & Teter, Antitrust: Rulemaking v. Adjudication in the FTC, 54 Geo.
L.J. 1106 (1966).
S. 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.61-.67 (Supp. 1965), as amended, 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.11-.16 (1973). After
the lower court decision held that the FTC had no rulemaking power, the FTC amended these
sections to limit rulemaking to explicitly authorized areas.
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came the first governmental body to take action on the Surgeon General's report
on smoking,6 by announcing that it proposed to engage in rulemaking pursuant
to its newly amended Rules of Practice. 7 Three months later it issued a trade
regulation rule requiring cigarette packages and advertisements to carry a dear
warning that smoking may be dangerous to health."
The FTC's claim to and use of substantive rulemaking power provoked a
storm of comment on the statutory authority for and the practical desirability
of FTC rulemaking.9 Only recently has the controversy been brought to the
courts for resolution.
In December, 1971, the Federal Trade Commission issued a trade regulation
rule making the failure to post octane numbers at service stations an "unfair
method of competition" and a "deceptive practice" in violation of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970). The rule, which was to have
become effective March 15, 1972,10 required no more than proof of failure to
post octane numbers to constitute a "deceptive act" or practice." The National
Petroleum Refiners Association brought suit in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia and won a stay of the rule. The case, one of first
impression,1 2 resulted in a holding that the FTC lacked the statutory authority
to issue trade regulations that have the effect of substantive law.Y" On appeal,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed this holding, finding
6. U.S. Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare, Smoking & Health: Report of the Advisory Comm. to the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service (1964).
7. 29 Fed. Reg. 530-32 (1964).
8. Id. 8325.
9. Arguing against the existence of rulemaking power are: Burrus & Teter, supra note 4,
at 1120-27; Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking
and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485 (1970);
Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative
Policy, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 921, 958-67 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Shapiro]; Weston, Deceptive Advertising and the Federal Trade Commission: Decline of Caveat Emptor, 24 Fed. B.J.
548 (1964). Scholars favoring the existence of the power are: K. Davis, Administrative Law
§ 6.18 (Supp. 1970); Auerbach, The Federal Trade Commission: Internal Organization and
Procedure, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 383 (1964); Elman, Rulemaking Procedures in the FTC's
Enforcement of the Merger Law, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 385 (1964); Fuchs, Agency Development
of Policy Through Rule-Making, 59 Nw. U.L. Rev. 781 (1965); Wegman, Cigarettes and
Health: A Legal Analysis, 51 Cornell L.Q. 678, 740-51 (1966).
Professor Davis is notably on the pro side of the question and indeed complains that the
FTC has not promulgated rules enough. K. Davis, Administrative Law § 6.18 (Supp. 1970).
10. 16 C.F.R. § 422.1 (1973).
11. Id.
12. National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 340 F. Supp. 1343, 1344 (D.D.C. 1972).
The closest precedents were two cases in which courts refused to enjoin FTC hearings held
to promulgate trade regulation rules. These cases held that plaintiff's proper procedure was
to attack the rule after it had been issued. Lever Bros. v. FTC, 325 F. Supp. 371 (D. Me.
1971); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 284 F. Supp. 745 (D.D.C. 1968), modified, 424 F.2d 935
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970). The Supreme Court has never faced the issue
squarely. National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 693 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
13. 340 F. Supp. at 1345.
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that the "Federal Trade Commission is authorized to promulgate rules defining
the meaning of the statutory standards of the illegality the Commission is empowered to prevent"' 4 and remanded the case for further proceedings. National
Petroleum Refiners Association v. FTC, 340 F. Supp. 1343 (D.D.C. 1972),
rev'd, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973).15
II.

SCOPE OF FTC RULEMAKING POWER

If the FTC was intended to have substantive rulemaking power, the grant is
to be found in section 6(g) of the Federal Trade Commission Act:
(g) From time to time to classify corporations and to make rules and regulations for
the purpose of carrying out the provisions of sections 41 to 46 and 47 to 58 of this
title.' 6

However, section 6 appears to be more a collection of investigatory powers than
a broad authorization for substantive rulemaking. It is devoted primarily to
specifying the commission's power to investigate businesses and to compel
corporate reports. Viewing subdivision (g) in this context, many have argued
that so vital a power as substantive rulemaking would not be buried in such an
assortment of powers as are encompassed by this section.' 7 To bolster this contention, those who dispute the commission's claim to rulemaking power focus
upon section 5(b) of the FTC Act which expressly directs the FTC to conduct
adjudicative proceedings.' 8 As they see it, case-by-case adjudication is the
exclusive method of enforcement at the FTC's disposal and section 6(g) empowers the commission only to issue "internal rules of organization, practice,
and procedure."' 9
On the other hand, the FTC asserts that section 5(b) specifies but one means
of enforcement; that sections 5 and 6 must be read in the context of the FTC
Act as an integrated whole; that section 5(a) (6) gives the commission broad
authority to prevent "unfair methods of competition ...

and unfair or deceptive

'
acts or practices in commerce. "20
The FTC potentially is a very powerful agency 2' and it cannot help but be
14.

482 F.2d at 698.

15. The case has not been appealed as of this writing. The cut-off date for filing for
certiorari is Nov. 5, 1973.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (1970). The sections referred to in § 6(g) of the FTC Act, §§ 41-46
and 47-58, comprise the full text of the basic FTC Act. The sections of the Act numbered
from § 61 are later amendments dealing with narrow, special areas (e.g., wool and fur
products, export trade).
17. See note 9 supra.
18. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970).
19. 340 F. Supp. at 1345.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1970).
21. § 5 of the FTC Act contains the substantive antitrust power special to the FTC,
namely, to declare unfair methods in commerce and unfair or deceptive practices in commerce unlawful. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970). 15 U.S.C. § 46(d) (1970) authorizes the FTC to
investigate violations of all of the antitrust laws on the order of the President or either
house of Congress. 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1970) empowers the commission to halt the dissemination
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controversial when it operates at the leading edge of its two major areas of
jurisdiction: the developing laws of antitrust and consumer protection. As a
result, the business community and the legal profession from time to time view
it with alarm; 22 for whether it acts by rulemaking or adjudication, the commission certainly has the power to effect substantial changes in the economic structure of this country. The potential for such a restructuring under the antitrust
laws would appear to be the most controversial aspect of the FTC's powers.
Consumer protection laws, on the other hand, would appear to be more universally popular. Moreover, the burden is lighter under consumer protection laws
as a rule: labeling products costs a company much less than the forced divestitures and licensings of brand names that the FTC presently seeks in the cereal
industry. The idea that the FTC can enact major reorganizations of the economy
by simple rulemaking is alarming to many and it is in this context that National
Petroleum Refiners must be viewed.
So far the FTC has been sparing in its use of rulemaking, directing its efforts
towards practices considered deceptive to the consumer. Since issuing the cigarette rule, the FTC has issued trade regulation rules covering sleeping bags,
binoculars, dry cell batteries, tablecloths, leather belts, used lubricating oil and
television screens. Rules forestalled pending litigation of the Natimal Peroleum Refiners case have been aimed at combatting rather obvious evils such as
of false advertising. Furthermore, under the "unfair trade practices" section (15 U.S.C. § 45
(1970)) the FTC can proscribe conduct that offends the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1970)). FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953); FTC v. Cement
Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948). In FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966), the Supreme
Court held that conduct which is merely "unfair" under § 5 of the FTC Act, but which
violates neither the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970)) nor the Clayton Act (15 U..C.
§§ 12-27 (1970)) may be proscribed by the FTC. Thus the FTC can range beyond the outer
limits of other antitrust legislation, and no perimeter to the scope of § S has been dram yet.
Indeed, this expansive view of the FTC Act's substantive antitrust section was affimed
recently in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239-44 (1972).
22. See Huth, An Ominous Storm in a Cereal Bowl, Fortune, July 1973, at 148 (dealing
with the FTC's efforts to break up the breakfast cereal industry through forced divestiture
of assets and licensing of trade names); The FTC Curbs Competition, Dun's, July 1973, at 13
(an interview with Professor Breyer of the Harvard Law School who feels that the FTC's
actions actually hurt the consumer by encouraging higher prices. Professor Breyer is quoted
as having said of some of the FTCs recent enabling legislation: "Supposedly designed to
protect the consumer, their practical effect is to protect one company against competition
from another . . . " Professor Breyer blames the grass roots power of the small businessman
for the FTC efforts in enforcing these "frivolous and anticompetitive statutes." He suggests
taking enforcement of the statutes from the FTC and giving it to the Justice Department,
which he feels is less susceptible to congressional pressure. Id. at 16).
Some examples of criticism of the FTC in scholarly legal journals (and this is by no means
intended as anything but a recent sampling) include: Ash et al., Ash Report on the FTC:
Antitrust Moving to the White House?, 4 Antitrust L. & Econ. Rev. 21 (Fall 1970) ; Frazier,
Comment on the Ash Report, 4 Antitrust L. & Econ. Rev. 41 (Fall 1970); Posner, A Dissenting View: Do We Really Need An FTC?, 3 Antitrust L. & Econ. Rev. 65 (Spring 1970);
Scanlon, Rooting Out Trivia at the FTC: The 'Habana Cigar' Affair, 4 Antitrust L. & Econ.
Rev. 89 (Spring 1971).
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certain practices of door-to-door salesmen, book clubs and franchising arrangements. 23 There would appear to be a good chance that the FTC will continue to
confine its use of rulemaking to setting guidelines in confused areas and to the
area of consumer protection. 2 4 In areas where the parties are few and the burden
of compliance heavy it may prefer to maintain traditional procedures. Of course,
it may be waiting for Congress or the Supreme Court to bring the controversy
to a final resolution. If the FTC were to provoke sufficient political controversy
through its use of rulemaking, Congress could swiftly revoke or limit the power.

III.

RULEMAKING V. ADJUDICATION

The heart of the legal controversy culminating in National Petroleum Refiners
seems to be not so much what the text of the FTC Act actually means but what
the processes of rulemaking and adjudication mean in the light of modem administrative procedure. This question is complicated by the fact that the actual
practices of agencies and courts may not coincide with the theoretical safeguards
inhering in each process.
The distinctions between rulemaking and adjudication are often blurred and
definition of either is difficult. "The most obvious definition of rule-making and
the one most often employed in the literature of administrative law asserts
simply that it is the function of laying down general regulations as distinguished
from orders that apply to named persons or to specific situations." 25 The Administrative Procedure Act's definitions of "rule" and "order" depart from this
classic definition.26 The APA defines "rule" as an "agency statement of general
or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or
prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice
requirements of an agency... ;",27 an "order" is what results from a procedure
23. 4 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. at 41,001-04 (1973) contains a complete list of promulgated
and proposed rules. See also Forte, The Food and Drug Administration, the Federal Trade
Commission and the Deceptive Packaging of Foods, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 860, 886-87 (1965);
Note, FTC Substantive Rulemaking: An Evaluation of Past Practice and Proposed Legislation, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 135, 143-47 (1973). Only once has the FTC used rulemaking to enforce the antitrust laws, and then it was "at the request of clothing retailers who charged
that clothing manufacturers were discriminating among them in providing promotional allowances for advertising. The rule provides that unless a manufacturer in the men's and boys'
clothing industry follows a written plan supplied to all retail customers, the FTC will presume
that promotional allowances are not made available to all retailers on equal terms." Id. at
146-47 (footnotes omitted).
24. Under the principal decision, the FTC at present appears ready to expand rulemaking
power no further than within its Bureau of Consumer Protection, in order to achieve more
precise definitions of "unfairness" and "deception." See N.Y. Times, July 18, 1973, at 18,
col 5.
25. Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 259, 263 (1938).
26. "Proceedings are classed as rule making under [the APA] not merely because, like the
legislative process, they result in regulations of general applicability but also because they involve subject matter demanding judgments based on technical knowledge and experience."
Sen. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1945).
27. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970).
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other than rulemaking.28 Courts have tended to distinguish rulemaking from
adjudication in that the29former deals with future events while the latter passes
judgment on past facts.
In the lengthy treatise which accompanied its first rule, 0 the FTC compared
the two methods of procedure and listed ten reasons why it ought to exercise
substantive rulemaking power 31 Summarized these are: (1) The adjudicative
process only brings into the proceedings the small number of the persons affected
by a decision, while the Administrative Procedure Act requires that all interested persons be given the opportunity to express their views before a proposed
rule is adopted 2 (2) The adjudicative process elucidates facts by trial-type
proceedings, a method ill-suited to the needs of policy and discretion in formulating rules of general application. It limits agencies to the record instead of
drawing on their special knowledge and experience. (3) As a result, the agency
may be precluded from "systematic access to the broad range of considerations
that must be taken into account.1 33 (4) Under the APA the agency cannot
consult those of its staff who serve as prosecutors in the adjudicative (adversary)
process, and so is cut off from part of its expertise. There is no such restraint in
a rulemaking proceeding. (5) Adjudication is not evenhanded. The firm first
subject to a final FTC order suffers more than its competitors. Some firms may
be able to litigate and escape regulation for lack of proof and thereby gain a
competitive advantage?' (6) Adjudication diverts the agency from its primary
role: that of providing guidance to businessmen. It often fails to set up clear
guidelines. (7) If the agency opts for the formulation of broad guidelines as its
primary goal, it may do less than justice to the parties before it in a particular
adjudicative proceeding. (8) Adjudicated rules are retroactive, while rules made
in formal rulemaking proceedings are not, under the APA (Q 2 (c)). (9) Rules,
unlike adjudication, do not result in stigmatization of persons as law breakers.
(10) The elaborate procedural safeguards of adjudicative proceedings make
them time consuming, costly and inefficient5
The FTC argument is a persuasive brief for the rulemaking process; however,
there are counterarguments. In reply to the FTC statement Professor Shapiro
raises several objections: 36 (1) The amicus brief permits comment by all inter28. Id. § 551(6).
29. See Federal Security Adm'r v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218 (1943); Prentis v.
Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908).
30. Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule, 29 Fed. Reg. 9325 (1964).
The Statement takes up 49 pages in the Federal Register. Professor Davis called it "scholarly
and persuasive." K. Davis, Administrative Law § 5.04 at 260 (Supp. 1970).
31. 29 Fed. Reg. 8366-68 (1964).
32. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521 (1970).
33. 29 Fed. Reg. 8367 (1964).
34. The FTC has been criticized for focusing on small firms to forge new policy in
FTC v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 US. 244 (1967) and Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 355

U.s. 411 (1958).
35.
36.

29 Fed. Reg. 8367 (1964).
Shapiro, supra note 9, at 930-42.
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ested parties in an adjudicative proceeding 31 Both adjudication and rulemaking
require agencies to employ some form of notice, and in either procedure "the
agency retains some discretion to act without warning."3 8 (2) Many agencies,
including the FTC, may initiate proceedings and need not wait for a complaint
to be lodged. In theory, although it has not done so, the FTC can exercise a
planned attack on abuses with adjudication as well as with rulemaking.8 (3)
Rulemaking can have a retroactive effect. One deprived of a trade name by rule
is as much hurt retroactively as one so deprived by an adjudicated cease-anddesist order. Further, courts may limit the retroactive effects of an adjudicated
rule. 40 (4) The FTC has been able to apply the adjudicative process evenhandedly to all members of an industry in the past. 4 1 (5) It may be harder to
examine large quantities of data in adjudicative proceedings, but it can be done,
42
and proceedings can be consolidated and streamlined.
But Professor Shapiro agrees with the FTC that reliance on adjudication as
the sole "vehicle for policymaking" can distort the adjudicative process. Sometimes no case will present itself which deals squarely with the issue that the
agency desires to resolve. 43 He also agrees that rules resulting from adjudication
have a tendency to be fragmented, whereas legislated rules are more often clear
and codified. 44 Moreover, agencies seem more willing to disregard their past
adjudications than to depart from their regulations .4
One of the aspects of rulemaking that most frightens the regulated parties is
their perception of it as lacking sufficient procedural protections. The due process
protection afforded by the APA, therefore, looms large in the background:
Before the adoption of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act it would have
been difficult to argue that the rule-making power bestowed in such statutes as the
Federal Trade Commission Act and the Natural Gas Act enabled an agency to cover
by legally binding regulations some of the same issues as might be involved in ceaseand-desist order or licensing proceedings required by the governing statutes; for by
the latter the persons concerned were entitled to be parties to trial-type adjudicatory
hearings for the determination of matters at issue, whereas no applicable statute
secured any procedural rights at all in rule-making. To substitute the latter for the
former would have been to eliminate statutory procedural protections as to certain
issues altogether. For this or other reasons, no claim seems to have been made until
recently in the literature concerning the Federal Trade Commission that it might
prohibit unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices in com-

37. Id. at 931.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 932.
Id. at 932-33.
Id. at 933-35.

41.

Id. at 935-36.

42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

936-37.
937-40.
940-41.
947.
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merce under the Federal Trade Commission Act, or define violations of those sections
...which it enforces, through binding general regulations ....*1

Yet even under the APA, a party's right to submit evidence to an agency is of
less value in a rulemaking than in an adjudicatory proceeding. In the absence of
a statute that confines an agency to rulemaking on the record of a public
hearing, the agency "may act not only on the basis of the comments received in
response to its notice of rule making, but also upon the basis of information
available in its own files, and upon the knowledge and expertise of the agency."4 7'
In an adjudicatory proceeding, on the other hand, agency action must be based
on the record and the "substantial evidence test"48 is invoked in every case as
the standard of judicial review. The common law originally developed and defined this test; the APA has adopted it. 49 Under the APA, this test applies to
rulemaking only "'[w]here rules are required by statute to be made on the
record after opportunity for an agency hearing . . . ;'" mere opportunity for

interested parties to be heard at an informal hearing is not enough to invoke the
0
test.5
An adjudicatory proceeding with all the procedural safeguards required by
the APA must still accompany the enforcement of every FTC rule. The regulated party, however, loses the leverage that he would have had in the absence
of rulemaking. In the instant case, for example, the gasoline vendors still must
be given a hearing as to whether they had, in fact, failed to post octane ratings.
What the FTC is spared is the necessity of proving that failure to post such
ratings is an unfair trade practice each time it proceeds against another defendant.51 The regulated party has the outside chance of proving that he is not in
the class that the rule was designed to affect-a difficult burden to carry.
There is much more to judicial review under the APA than the substantial
evidence test and all but that test applies to rulemaking as well as to adjudica46. Fuchs, Agency Development of Policy Through Rule-Making, 59 Nw. U.L. Rev. 781,
797 (1965) (footnote omitted).
47. California Citizens Band Ass'n v. United States, 375 F.2d 43, 54 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 844 (1967); accord, Boating Indus. Ass'n v. Boyd, 409 F-2d 405, 411-12 (7th
Cir. 1969); Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 343 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
48. "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Consolidated
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). "We are required to sustain the Board's
findings, if reasonable minds, unhampered by preconceptions derived from the technical law
of evidence, might differ as to conclusions to be drawn from the evidence presented."
Machinists Lodge 35 v. NTLRB, 110 F.2d 29, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1939), aff'd, 311 U.S. 72 (1940).
49. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). The test is codified in 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(E) (1970).
50. Borden Co. v. Freeman, 256 F. Supp. 592, 601 (D.N.J. 1966), af'd, 369 F.2d 404
(3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 992 (1967), quoting 5 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (1964)
(since unchanged).
51. 482 F.2d at 690.
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tion.52 However, the language of the FTC Act is so broad that the thought of
rulemaking under it seemed awesome even to former FTC Chairman Dixon:
Only Congress can [issue rules with the full effect of law] unless they tell somebody
else to do that. Now, in our broad, generic statute under section 6(g), Congress said
we could make our own rules and regulations. Well, no one has ever been foolish
enough at the Commission
yet to try to write law under that kind of a statute, under
53
that broad thing.
Indeed, past performance of the courts in reviewing
adjudication under the FTC
4
Act sometimes has borne Chairman Dixon out.
Despite the foregoing considerations, the court in National Petroleum Refiners
stressed the protection that judicial review provides:
Any fears that the agency could successfully use rule-making power as a means of
oppressive or unreasonable regulation seem exaggerated in view of courts' general
practice in reviewing rules to scrutinize their statement of basis and purpose to see
whether the major issues of policy pro and con raised in the submissions to the agency
were given sufficient consideration ....
The Commission is hardly free to write its own
law of consumer protection and antitrust since the statutory standard which the rules
may define with greater particularity is a legal standard. Although the Commission's
condusions as to the standard's reach are ordinarily shown deference ... the standard
must "get [its] final meaning from judicial construction."65
If the court was overly optimistic on the subject of judicial review, it was on
safe ground when it cited a line of cases not even mentioned in the district
court's opinion favoring rulemaking over adjudication. This line of cases began
with SEC v. Chenery Corp.,5 6 where the Supreme Court stated a preference for
52. Under the APA, courts can set aside agency action that is: "(A) arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional
right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations, or short of statutory right; (D) without observance of procedure required by
law; (E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this
title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or (F)
unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to a trial de novo by the
reviewing court." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1970).
53. Statement in part of former FTC Chairman Dixon, Hearings on S. 1666 & S. 1663 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
88th Cong., 1st Seass. 169-70 (1963). This testimony and more like it are to be found in Note,
The FTC's Claim of Substantive Rulemaking Power: A Study in Opposition, 41 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 330, 333-34 (1972).
54. "Yet, the court sometimes seems to approve Commission declarations that certain conduct is 'unfair' without any noticeable reasoning either by the court or by the Commission as
to why the conduct should be within the statute." P. Areeda, Antitrust Analysis 34 (1967)
(footnote omitted). The very adjudicative procedure of the FTC has been seen to take on
a legislative character under this form of judicial review. As Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting
in FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 490 (1952), said: "That the work of a Commission
in translating an abstract statute into a concrete cease and desist order in large measure
escapes judicial review because of its legislative character is an axiom of administrative
law .. ."

55. 482 F.2d at 692-93, quoting FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965).
56. 332 U.S. 194 (1947). In Chenery, the Court said that the SEC might use either rule-
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rulemaking procedures over ad hoc adjudication when the agency intended a
major departure from policy. The Chenery Court approved rulemaking because
it has less retroactive effect and does not focus on a lone defendant. Next, the
court discussed NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.,5 7 in which a plurality opinion
lauded the APA's procedures for rulemaking and deplored the use of adjudication to formulate a policy changeY8 Finally, the court turned to Bell Aerospace
Co. Division of Textron, Inc. v. NLRB,"0 wherein the Second Circuit refused
to enforce an NLRB order on the ground that it effected such far-reaching
changes in the definition of types of workers that rulemaking instead of adjudication should have been employed. More recently, in Weinberger v. Bentex
Pharmaceuticals,Inc.' ° the Supreme Court followed this line of decisions and
praised the fairness of rulemaking in advance of adjudication.
These cases do not speak to the question of whether the FTC does in fact
have rulemaking power. They dealt with agencies which had both rulemaking
and adjudication dearly available. But the cases do establish a climate of
judicial opinion 6 ' from which the instant decision seems a natural outgrowth. As
the court said:
[T]here is little question that the availability of substantive rule-making gives any
making or case-by-case adjudication. The SEC issued an adjudicative order in a situation
where it previously had not had occasion to formulate a rule. The Court refused to say that
the SEC was forbidden to use an adjudicative proceeding to announce and apply a new standard of conduct, although the action penalized might have been avoided had a rule been issued
earlier.
57. 394 U.S. 759 (1969). The Court was faced with the question of whether the NLRB
could use adjudication to promulgate requirements solely prospective in effect and thus avoid
APA formal rulemaking procedures. It held that APA requirements had to be met even if
rulemaking occurred in the course of adjudicatory proceedings. Nevertheless, the rule was
enforceable as an adjudicatory order against those who were party to the proceedings.
58. 394 U.S. at 764. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting, also argued that far-reaching policy
changes should not be made in the course of adjudicating special facts. Id. at 777.
59. 475 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973).
60. 93 S. CL 2488 (1973). In this 7-0 decision penned by Mr. Justice Douglas, the Court
found that forcing the FDA to use a case-by-case approach would be too slow and unwieldy
in view of the large number of drugs it must deal with and in the light of congressional intent.
The Court said: "In a case much more clouded with doubts than this one, we held that we
would not 'in the absence of compelling evidence that such was Congress' intention . . . prohibit administrative action imperative for the achievement of an agency's ultimate purposes."'
Id. at 2494.
61. Language praising rulemaking is plentiful in administrative law cases. E.g., "Rule making has a unique value and importance as an administrative technique for evolution of general
policy, notwithstanding, or perhaps indeed because of, the freedom from the procedures carefully prescribed to assure fairness in individual adjudication." American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB,
359 F.2d 624, 630 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966) (citations omitted). Judge
Friendly has praised it: "Although the case-by-case method should not be abandoned even if
that were possible, it should be supplemented by much greater use of two other devices-policy
statements and rulemaking." H. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for
Better Definition of Standards 145 (1962) (footnote omitted). See also Hector, Problems of
the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69 Yale L.J. 931 (1960).
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agency an invaluable resource-saving flexibility in carrying out its task of regulating
parties subject to its statutory mandate. More than merely expediting the agency's
job, use of substantive rule-making is increasingly felt to yield significant benefits to
those the agency regulates. Increasingly, courts are recognizing that use of rule-making
to make innovations in agency policy may actually be fairer to regulated parties than
total reliance on case-by-case adjudication.02
The court thus viewed rulemaking as the answer to the FTC's problems of
slowness and inefficiency:
The problems of delay and inefficiency . . . have plagued the Trade Commission

down to the present. While the Commission has broad common law-like authority to
delineate the scope of the statute's prohibitions . . . like the federal courts it was

designed to supplement, it has remained hobbled in its task by the delay inherent in
repetitious, lengthy litigation of cases involving complex factual questions under a
broad legal standard. 63
IV.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF

HE FTC ACT

However, as the court of appeals pointed out, the question at issue was not
simply "a policy judgment as to what mode of procedure-adjudication alone or
a mixed system of rule-making and adjudication, as the Commission [proposed]
-best accommodates the need for effective enforcement of the Commission's
mandate ....
The Federal Trade Commission is a creation of Congress ....
The extent of its powers can be decided only by considering the powers Congress
specifically granted it in the light of the statutory language and background."0 4
The court, therefore, had to look to the legislative history behind the Act to
determine the existence of FTC rulemaking power.
The legislative history of the FTC Act is not clearly dispositive on the question of congressional intent. There are many inconsistent statements in the floor
debates, the outgrowth of powerfully conflicting political positions in the Congress of 1914.
The court of appeals in the main body of its opinion stressed the broad legislative intent behind the entire Act, arguing that its thrust was to create an
agency to supplement the slow movement of the Justice Department and the
courts in cases of unfair business practices. 6 Thus, in the court's opinion, one
of the key reasons for creating the FTC was a desire for speedy-policing of unfair, anticompetitive practices. 66 The availability of rulemaking power certainly

would help to accomplish this end. However, the legislative history is ambiguous
as to whether section 6(g) was intended to confer such power.
The very origin of section 6(g) raised a technical problem for the court.
Both the court of appeals and the district court agreed that neither the original
House nor Senate bill contained a rulemaking provision; that the provision in
62.

482 F.2d at 681.

63. Id. at 690.
64. Id. at 674.
65. Id. at 686-89.
66. For other possible reasons see G. Henderson, The Federal Trade Commission: A Study
in Administrative Law and Procedure 21-23 (1924).

19731

SUBSTANTIVE FTC RULEMAKING

question emerged from the Conference Committee in the final bill submitted to
both houses. 67 The district court pointed out that according to House and Senate
rules "a Conference Committee cannot authorize new legislation that has not
been submitted by one of the two Houses." s The court of appeals, on the other
hand, pointed out that leaders of House and Senate conferees assured Congress
that the compromise bill was within the allowable limits of conference changePca
"Moreover," the court continued, "while this general principle of germaneness
as to the powers of a conference may bind Congress, it has never bound the
courts, which have frequently faced the problem of interpreting legislation in
light of conference changes." 70
Some of the comments on rulemaking power made in the debates caused the
lower court and some scholars to conclude that Congress never intended to grant
substantive rulemaking power to the FTC. Before dealing with these remarks,
the appellate court, citing United States v. Oregon,71 pointed out that comments
made on the floor cannot override the plain language of a statute. Unfortunately,
the language of the FTC Act is anything but plain-even in light of legislative
history. The court of appeals argued that many of the quoted remarks made
during the floor debates which so impressed the district court were made while
Congress was focused on issues other than a grant of rulemaking power-on the
grant of the power to fix prices.7 2 For example, there is one passage quoted by
the lower court7" which is quoted more fully and explained in the court of
appeals' opinion. 74 This passage, said the appellate court, referred to the distinction between the ICC's "legislative" power to act positively by setting rates,
and the FTC's "administrative" power, which has no legal effect unless enforced
by agency proceedings against specific parties.7 5 In explaining the distinction,
the court referred to United States v. Grimaud,70 relied on by Congressman
67. 482 F.2d at 704; 340 F. Supp. at 1346 n.12.
68. 340 F. Supp. at 1346 n.12.
69. 482 F.2d at 704.
70. Id. at 704, citing St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 'U.S. 208, 221-22 (1961).
The St. Regis case upheld the use of criminal fines to compel reports in obedience to a subpoena under the FTC Act.
71. 366 U.S. 643, 647-48 (1961), cited by the court at 482 F.2d at 686. The Oregon Court

said of views expressed on the floor of Congress during passage of a bill: "But such statements, even when they stand alone, have never been regarded as sufficiently compelling to justify deviation from the plain language of a statute. They are even less so here for there is
powerful countervailing evidence as to the intention of those who drafted the bilL" 366 US.
643, 648 (1961).
72. 482 F.2d at 704-07.

73. 340 F. Supp. at 1346 n.15.
74. 482 F.2d at 707. This passage reads, in part: "The Federal trade commirsion Will
have no power to prescribe the methods of competition to be used in future. In L-suing
its orders it will not be exercising power of a legislative nature.... (I]t will exercise power
of a judicial nature." 51 Cong. Rec. 14932 (1914).

75. 482 F.2d at 707-08.
76. 220 U.S. 506 (1911). See also Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 385-87

(1907).
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Covington in the remarks in question. There a unanimous Court held that

the Secretary of Agriculture could promulgate criminal regulations under the
Forest Reserve Act because he was not legislating but merely filling in details
of the Act. Thus, the court of appeals concluded, the regulations were administrative, rather than legislative. Many more historic materials are cited by
the court in the Appendix than belong in this brief review. In sum, the court
proves that the legislative history of the FTC Act is at least subject to more
than one interpretation.
V.

CAsEs EXPANDING RULEmAKING PowRs

There is authority to the effect that administrative agencies need not derive
rulemaking power exclusively from express statutory language.7 8 The authority
may be deemed implied from the power granted to the agency.70 Whether the
FTC Act does grant rulemaking power to the FTC is the question of this case.

However, provisions similar to section 6(g) of the FTC Act have been interpreted as conferring such power.8 0

The district court distinguished cases of this kind from National Petroleum
Refiners by the absence of a legislative history indicating an intent to grant
rulemaking power. 8 ' The court of appeals not only found an ambiguous legisBroadcasting Co.8s and its
lative history82 but also cited United States v. Storer
84
progeny as authority for its broader interpretation.

77. 482 F.2d at 708.
78. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414
(1944); J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928). To the contrary
and still not expressly overruled are: Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). But the statute interpreted In
Panama was characterized by exceptional executive disorganization and absent that factor
the case would not be followed today. Furthermore, Schechter involved an excessive delegation not likely to be made again. K. Davis, Administrative Law § 2.01, at 76 (1958).
79. Mourning v. Family Publ. Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973); Public Serv. Comm'n v.
FPC, 327 F.2d 893, 897 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956) dealing with
§§ 154(i) and 303(r) of the Federal Communications Act (47 U.S.C. §§ 154(1), 303(r)
(1970)) ; American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 311 (1953) which held that
§ 19 of the Motor Carrier Act (49 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1970)) authorized the ICC to Issue
certain regulations; Pacific Coast European Conf. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 376 F.2d 785,
789 (D.C. Cir. 1967) which held that § 43 of the Shipping Act (46 U.S.C. § 841a (1970))
gave the FMC rulemaking power; Morgan Stanley & Co. v. SEC, 126 F.2d 325 (2d Cir.
1942) which held that § 20 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act (15 U.S.C. § 79t(a)
(1970)) gave rulemaking power to the SEC; Borden Co. v. Freeman, 256 F. Supp. 592, 598
(D.N.J. 1966), afl'd, 369 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 992 (1967) which held
that the Secretary of Agriculture had rulemaking power under § 463 of the Poultry Inspection
Act (21 U.S.C. § 463 (1970)).
81. 340 F. Supp. at 1349.
82. 482 F.2d at 698-709.
83. 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
84. 482 F.2d at 678-81. United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956) and
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Storer held that even though the Federal Communications Act 5 required a
"full hearing" before a license could be denied, the FCC's authority to make a
rule limiting the number of television stations owned by any one person was
not limited by the requirement for a hearing on denial of a license application.
"The Communications Act must be read as a whole and with appreciation ...
of the
body charged with its fair and efficient operation."8 0 In FPC v. Texaco,
Inc.,8 7 the Court construed section 16 of the Natural Gas Act.88 There, the FPC
had conducted an argument-type hearing before issuing regulations providing
for the summary rejection of contracts with "impermissible" pricing provisions.89 Following that, the FPC rejected contracts with such "impermissible"
pricing provisions without any hearing, let alone a trial-type hearing. The Court
held that such action did not violate the APA, citing Storer, and said the FPC
need not proceed case-by-case to outlaw all indefinite price changing provisions. 90 American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 91 dealt with the question of whether
section 401(g) of the Federal Aviation Act 92 required a full adjudicatory hearing to modify airlines' certificates to reserve "blocked space service" to all-cargo
carriers. The case extended the Storer doctrine from an effect merely on future
rights to an effect on present rights.93 There is much language praising rulemaking in the case, but it is not a case about finding implied rulemaking powers.
In the recent case of Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc.,P4 this
line of reasoning was continued and Storer and Texaco were cited and followed.
These cases, cited by the court in National Petroleum Refiners, merely say
that an agency that has rulemaking power can deny a party a trial-type hearing
even though such a hearing might appear to be guaranteed by statute. They do
not read implied rulemaking powers into statutes lacking such powers. Still,
they help the cause of the FTC, for, although many feel that section 5 of the
FTC Act by its language limits the FTC solely to adjudication, 3 this line of
decisional law shows that rulemaking power, if it exists, can coexist with the
adjudicative powers of an agency without doing violence to procedural rights.
Rulemaking has been found implied in statutes which did not expressly grant
FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964), are cited most recently in Weinberger v. Hynson,
Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 93 S. Ct. 2469, 2478 (1973).

85. 47 U.S.C. § 309(b) (1970).
86. 351 U.S. at 203.
87. 377 U.S. 33 (1964).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 717o (1970). This section provides that "[t]he [FPC] shall have power to
perform any and all acts, and to prescribe, issue, make, amend, and rescind such orders, rules,
and regulations as it may find necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this
chapter."
89. 377 U.S. at 35-37.
90. Id. at 44.
91. 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966).
92. 49 U.S.C. § 1371(g) (1970).
93. 359 F.2d at 628-29.
94. 93 S.Ct. 2469, 2478-79 (1973).
95. See notes 18-19 supra and accompanying text.
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it, but only in rather limited areas. Both the district and appellate courts cited
cases finding implied rulemaking without any analysis of their holdings. The
lower court said they did not apply to this case; the court of appeals found
that they did. If they do, they would seem to be rather weak authority.
In American Trucking Associations v. United States,00 for example, the 1935
Motor Carrier Act, as amended, 7 was found to allow the ICC to promulgate
rules governing the use by authorized motor carriers of leased or exchanged
equipment. Even though the Act did not refer expressly to leasing practices,
"the rules in question [were found to be] aimed at conditions which may directly frustrate the success of the regulation undertaken by Congress."'0 Similarly, the court cited Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 0 which
approved rulemaking under the Truth in Lending Act' 00 even though the rule
extended the definition of a "credit" transaction to cover the sale of magazine
subscriptions. The court in National Petroleum Refiners quoted the Mourning
Supreme Court decision as approving rulemaking under language similar to that
of section 6(g) of the FTC Act as long as the rule is "'reasonably related to
the purposes of the enabling legislation.' ,'10
The rulemaking powers found implied in the cited cases are far less encompassing than that claimed by the FTC. But the FTC is not really seeking an
implied grant of rulemaking power; rather it argues that the power was expressly granted by the FTC Act. The cases merely illustrate that the courts
are not hostile to the rulemaking process; that they will extend it to new areas
where it makes sense to do so.
Nevertheless, the refiners' association contended that these cases do not apply
to the FTC because it is a prosecuting, investigatory arm of the executive rather
than a regulatory agency. The appellate court responded that the absence of a
power to set rates or grant licenses was not a distinction between regulatory and
prosecuting agencies. The court did remark on the tremendous breadth of the
commission's power under the antitrust laws and its mandate to protect the
consumer.10 2 However, even this wide power was felt not to be a reason to set
the FTC apart because the very breadth of its jurisdiction made it "but a
quibble to differentiate between the potential pervasiveness of the FTC's power
and that of the other regulatory agencies merely on the basis of its prosecutorial
and adjudicatory mode of proceeding."' 0 3 By this circular reasoning the court
appears to have conceded that the FTC is indeed a special type of agency.
The lower court opinion is terse and self-assured. The major arguments
against the FTC's claim are set forth briefly. The court seemed most impressed
by the fact that the FTC never thought it had rulemaking power until recently,
96. 344 U.S. 298 (1953).
97. 49 U.S.C. § 304(a), (b) (1970).

98. 344 U.S. at 311.
99. 411 U.s. 356 (1973).
100.
101.
102.
103.

15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970).
411 U.S. at 369, quoted in 482 F.2d at 689.
482 F.2d at 684-85.
Id. at 685.
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and by Congress' failure to indicate dearly whether it intended the FTC to
have it. The court of appeals, on the other hand, wrote a long opinion, heavily
documented with citations. Some of its arguments seem tenuous but the opinion
as a whole is persuasive. Its treatment of the history of the FTC Act and of
congressional comments since its passage refutes the findings of the lower courtThe case law cited is not controlling, since this is a case of first impression without dose analogues. The court of appeals, however, unlike the lower court,
positioned this case in a modem judicial perspective: in a framework of case
law favoring rulemaking for the speed and efficiency it bestows on agencies
created for the very purpose of speedy and efficient regulation. But the court
is careful to confine its decision to a construing of the FTC Act in the light of
Congress' intent in 1914.104 Probably the most important difference between
the district court and the court of appeals in terms of the outcome of the case
lies in their differing approaches to statutory construction.
As its concluding argument the lower court quoted Mr. Justice Brandeis:
"What the Government asks is not a construction of the statute, but, in effect,
an enlargement of it by the court, so that what was omitted, presumably by
inadvertence, may be included within its scope. To supply omissions transcends
the judicial function." 10 5 In contrast to this rather narrow approach the court
of appeals said:
Nor are we persuaded .
that ... we should apply the maxim of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius and conclude that adjudication is the
only means of defining the [FTC's] statutory standard. This maxim is increasingly
considered unreliable ... for it stands on the faulty premise that all possible alternative or supplemental provisions were necessarily considered and rejected by the
legislative draftsmen.10 6
And the court concluded: "In such circumstances, we must perform our customary task of coming to an independent judgment as to the statute's meaning, confident that if Congress believes that its creature, the Commission, thus
1°
exercises too much power, it will repeal the grant."
104. Id. at 674.
105. Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 251 (1926), quoted in 340 F. Supp. at 1350.
106. 482 F.2d at 675-76 (citations omitted). In Potomac Passengers Ass'n v. Chesapeake
& 0. Ry., 475 F.2d 325 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. National R.R. Passengers Corp.
v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 411 U.S. 981 (1973) (No. 72-1289), the court
observed: "Appellees contend that under the well established maxim of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius the statute's express provision of standing for
the Attorney General... must be read as an implied exclusion of standing for other parties.
We think too much is made of the maxim in this case. Whatever superficial appeal the maxim
may have, courts have often noted that it must be applied with a certain degree of caution. It
is only an aid to statutory construction, not a rigid rule of law." Id. at 331 (emphasis
deleted).
107. 482 F.2d at 697. Had the rulemaking power not been found by the court, Congress
might have conferred it explicitly by bills relating to "unfair and deceptive practices" under
consideration in both houses. See S. 356, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 109 (1973); H.R. 20, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 203 (1973). The House bill would limit FTC rulemaking to procedural
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The court reasoned that where congressional intent is as obscure as it is
here, 0 8 it must construe the language of the statute in the light of the broad
policies behind it.'0 9 It found support for an expansive interpretation of agency
power in the Permian Basin Area Rate Cases,"0 in Thorpe v. Housing Authority,"' in 1.I. Case Co. v. Borak," 2 and finally in the recent Mourning v. Family
PublicationsService, Inc."3
As discussed above, one of the difficulties in finding an express grant of rulemaking power in the FTC Act is that sections 5 and 6 appear to deal with
separate and unrelated matters. The Supreme Court unanimously found the Act
to be an "integrated whole" in United States v. Morton Salt Co." 4 In addition
to Morton Salt, the court cited the weaker FTC v. Dean Foods Co.,15 Where
the "Supreme Court rejected arguments that the Commission ...having sought
rules and to "rules defining with specificity acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive
to consumers." H.R. 20 § 203 (proposed FTC Act § 6(g)(1)). The Senate bill would leave
the FTC free to issue rules in any area, including under the antitrust laws. S. Rep, No. 269,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1971).
108. 482 F.2d at 686.
109. Id. at 689, citing FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 349 (1968); Bird v.
United States, 187 U.S. 118, 124 (1902) ; United States v. Blasius, 397 F.2d 203, 207 n.9 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1008 (1969).
110. 390 U.S. 747, 776 & nA0 (1968): "Surely the [FPC's] broad responsibilities therefore
demand a generous construction of its statutory authority."
111. 393 U.S. 268, 277-81 (1969). The case dealt with the question of whether a tenant
in a federally assisted housing project could be evicted without notice and a hearing when
HUD ordered that such a procedure be used after eviction proceedings were underway. The
Court held that the HUD order was an agency rule, pursuant to § 8 of the United States
Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970). Furthermore, the court found that even as a
rule (as opposed to mere advice) it did not deny due process, citing the Permian Basin Area
Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 779-80 (1968). Id. at 280 n.35.
112. 377 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1964). There the Court found that the SEC Act of 1934
impliedly created federal court jurisdiction of private suits for damages resulting from violation of the Act.
113. 411 U.S. 356, 369-73 (1973); see text accompanying notes 99-101 supra.
114. 338 U.S. 632, 650 (1950). Part of the Morton Salt opinion which the court referred
to says in part: "Respondents derive from legislative history their contention that Congress
divided the duties and powers of the Commission into two separate categories, one In § 6
merely re-enacting the old powers of investigation and publicity in antitrust matters--essentially a mere continuance of the former powers of the old Bureau of Corporations.' The other
was a new unfair-competition power, self-contained and sealed off in § 5. It is argued that
the reports set forth in § 6 can be required only 'in support of general economic surveys and
not in aid of enforcement proceedings under . . . section 5.'
"While we find a good deal which would warrant our concluding that § 6 was framed with
the pre-existing antitrust laws in mind, and in the expectation that the information procured
would be chiefly useful in reports to the President, the Congress, or the Attorney General, we
find nothing that would deny its use for any purpose within the duties of the Commission,
including a § 5 proceeding." Id. at 649; see 482 F.2d at 677.
115. 384 U.S. 597 (1966).
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similar powers unsuccessfully from Congress, should not be granted them by
judicial implication."' 116
The trial court was much impressed by the fact that the FTC had treated
section 6(g) as referring only to procedural rulemaking for nearly fifty years." 7
On the other hand, the court of appeals stressed that the "rules and regulations"
of the section ought to be construed broadly. 118 Moreover, the court of appeals
rejected the contention that such a history foreclosed any other interpretation
of the statute. 119
The trial court found a de facto congressional ratification of such an interpretation of the Act in Congress' express grant of limited rulemaking power in
certain amendments to the FTC Act. 20 The court of appeals found such statutory construction unreliable.' 2 ' By expanding the commission's powers in these
areas, wrote the appellate court, Congress expressed only a desire to assure that
the FTC would have rulemaking power in at least these areas and was motivated
by uncertainty "and a desire to avoid litigation."'"'
VI. CONCLUSION
The FTC now has substantive rulemaking power, at least until Congress or
the Supreme Court says otherwise. Probably it was originally intended to have
it. For Congress not only has not checked the FTC since its assumption of the
116. 482 F.2d at 678. The Dean Foods Court said: "This Court has consistently refused to
construe such requests by government agencies and the resulting nonaction of the Congress
as affirmative evidence of no authority." 384 U.S. 597, 610 (1966). This was a five-four decision with a powerful dissent by MAr. Justice Fortas.
117. 340 F. Supp. at 1347, 1349-50.
118. See notes 104-13 supra and accompanying text.
119. "The fact that powers long have been unexercised well may call for dose scrutiny as
to whether they exist; but if granted, they are not lost by being allowed to lie dormant, any
more than nonexistent powers can be prescripted by an unchallenged exercise." United States
v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 647 (1950). While statements of FTC commissioners on the
question of the existence of the power must be given "'great weight,"' they are not binding
on the courts, especially as this was not a question for special expertise. 482 F.2d at
694. The court also rejected the appellee's argument that this would be too important an
innovation to be granted in the absence of a very dear legislative intent. 482 F.2d at 691. It
distinguished its own opinion in Textile & Apparel Group v. FTC, 410 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 910 (1969), pointing out that the departure from prior practice in that
case would have denied the parties a hearing and was a sharper departure from the commission's usual proceedings than would be the use of substantive rulemaking. 482 F.2d at 691.
120. Such power was granted in the Wool Products Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 68b (1970);
the Fur Products Labeling Act of 1951, 15 U.S.C. § 69f(b) (1970); The Flammable
Fabrics Act of 1953, as amended 15 U.S.C. § 1194(c) (1970); the Textile Fiber Products
Identification Act of 1958, 15 U.S.C. § 70e(c) (1970); and the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act of 1967, 15 U.S.C. § 1454 (1970). The trial court particularly stressed the amendment to the Flammable Fabrics Act making rulemaking power explicit for "fabrics, related
materials, and products" as proof of the intent of Congress. 340 F. Supp. at 1347-48.
121. 482 F.2d at 696 n.33.
122. Id. at 696.
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power in 1962 but also began legislation to grant an express rulemaking power
shortly before the lower court found against the FTC.128 This legislation would
have granted the FTC the power in at least the limited area of "unfair and
deceptive practices," i.e., the area encompassing the burgeoning law of consumerism. 124 It is in this area that the unfair practices seem most clearly
offensive to most people, and it is here that the number of offenders is often
awkwardly large. On the other hand, antitrust law is far more complex and
difficult today than it was when the FTC Act was drafted in 1914. The FTC
has tried only once to use rulemaking power in the antitrust area and it does not
seem likely to move in this area in the near future. 12 5 Perhaps attempted rulemaking in the antitrust area would be the use of the power that would make
Congress expressly and finally limit or abolish the power. For the court, of
course, there was no choice but to find the full power or none. In finding the
power it has left the way open for exploration of the best uses of rulemaking
by the FTC. This experiment, if carried out cautiously, should be beneficial to
the commission and to the public.
123.
124.
125.

See note 107 supra.
Id.
See notes 20-24 supra and accompanying text.

